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SMOKE SIGNALS FROM PRIVATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL IN MEGA SOCIAL POLICY CASES
Michael L. Rustad*
INTRODUCTION
The film, Erin Brockovich, depicts the true story of a young woman
who helped to launch a toxic torts lawsuit that ultimately resulted in a
$333 million class action settlement against a California utility for pol-
luting the local water supply.1 Legal crusaders, like the real-life Erin
Brockovich, protect the public by uncovering corporate conduct that
threatens the community. William Prosser described torts as "a body
of law which is directed toward the compensation of individuals rather
than the public for losses which they have suffered."' 2 The articles in
this panel provide empirical evidence that tort law is increasingly a
private law subject with a public vision. Tort law is increasingly an
institution of social control and public policy, expanding from its tradi-
tional role of compensation and reducing the cost of accidents. Tort
law, like sunlight, acts as a disinfectant by exposing hidden threats to
the public welfare not detected by public authorities.3 The articles in
this Symposium reflect the reality that tort law has been transformed
from compensating private individuals to private law that empowers
often disadvantaged individuals with a public purpose.4 Mass torts are
effectively the only compensation system in a society without a na-
tional safety net.5 The tobacco litigation is a touchstone of tort law's
* Michael L. Rustad is the Thomas F. Lambert Jr. Professor of Law & Director of the High
Technology Law Program at Suffolk University Law School in Boston. Professor Rustad was of
counsel for the Amicus Curiae Brief of the Coalition for Consumer Rights and University Schol-
ars and Law Professors in Illinois v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 2001 I11. LEXIS 1431 (I11. Oct. 18, 2001).
1. Charles Laurence, Crusader in High Heels, THE MIRROR, April 5, 2000, at 22-23.
2. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5 (5th ed. 1984).
3. This phrase adapts Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 92 (1971).
4. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 1 (1995) (noting that
courts in the post-World War II period "held out the prospect of empowerment through the
courts of the disadvantaged").
5. Diane P. Wood, Commentary on The Futures Problem, by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1933, 1940 (200U)(noting that the United States has no national safety net providing
medical or health services to the victims of tobacco and other dangerous products such as in
Europe).
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expanding social and public policy role. The tobacco reimbursement
lawsuits resulted in the largest reallocation of the costs of wrongdoing
in Anglo-American history. The states retained private law firms to
fund and litigate tobacco lawsuits in multiple states. The private law
firms that were hired by the states in the tobacco litigation had the
expertise, experience, and financial means necessary to recover bil-
lions of dollars spent to reallocate the health costs of smoking-related
illnesses.
"Tobacco use is the single leading cause of preventable death in the
United States."' 6 The tobacco industry did not pay damages to a single
smoking victim in four decades of litigation. Congress required that
cigarette packages warn consumers of cigarettes' risk to smokers by
the mid-1960s.7 However, the United States Supreme Court held in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. that a common law tort claim based
on failure to warn was preempted. 8 The Court's interpretation of the
Supremacy Clause eliminated the possibility of failure to warn prod-
uct liability cases against Big Tobacco. The practical effect of the
states' reimbursement lawsuits was to overcome the preemption hur-
dle in Cipollone, which precluded most products liability claims
brought by individuals. Another obstacle to tobacco product liability
was the refusal of federal courts to certify class action lawsuits. 9 The
tobacco settlement "was the result of nearly two years of litigation
brought by forty-six Attorneys General in what were called the 'Medi-
caid cases,' wherein the states sued the tobacco companies for the
health care injury inflicted by tobacco consumption.' 10 The tobacco
settlement resulted in one of the largest settlements in Anglo-Ameri-
can legal history and presents an opportunity to examine the past, pre-
sent, and future of social policy torts in general.
II. HENSLER'S RESEARCH AGENDA FOR SOCIAL POLICY TORTS
Deborah Hensler's article entitled The New Social Policy Torts is a
research agenda combining social science and doctrine." Hensler's
6. CDC, DHHS, Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost-
United States, 42 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 33, 645-49 (1993).
7. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992).
8. Id. at 517.
9. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996)(declining to certify a Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3)(D) class action).
10. Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors, and Public Policy, 26 AM. J.L. &
MED. 187, 188 (2000).
11. Deborah Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative Strategy; Some
Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 493 (2001) (Paper
presented at the Seventh Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy: Smoke
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study of social policy torts has profound implications for understand-
ing the expanding social impact of the tobacco settlement. The settle-
ment was the first time that the tobacco industry paid a single dollar to
the victims of tobacco, their families, or the state. Prior to the reim-
bursement lawsuits, government regulators, and legislators were una-
ble or unwilling to tackle Big Tobacco, despite serious threats to the
public health. The state's decision to deputize private law firms to
fund and conduct the tobacco litigation would be an excellent case
study for social and policy. The states lacked the resources to take on
the powerful tobacco industry and redress harm caused to millions of
Americans. The tobacco settlement shaped public policy by reallocat-
ing the financial burden of caring for tobacco smokers, and increasing
the accountability of the industry in its marketing practices.
Professor Hensler's article is a research proposal for an empirical
study of the role of public and private litigation in shaping social pol-
icy. She asks whether it is appropriate for social policy torts to be
"entrusted to entrepreneurial private lawyers?"' 2 Social policy torts
have been criticized as "a form of regulation through litigation in that
attorneys general not only seek payments for government programs
that help those who have been injured but also seek changes in the
business practices of the industries being sued."'13 Professor Hensler's
article proposes a social policy analysis of the role of tobacco litigation
and other complex cases that have social ends, "social policy" torts.14
The tobacco litigation has inspired new private/public partnerships in
handgun, lead paint, and managed care litigation. She asks whether it
is good public policy to entrust changes in industry practice to private
litigants.15 "Should legislatures validate the results of privately nego-
tiated lawsuit settlements?"' 16 Is it good social policy to permit private
litigators to receive large fees from such litigation? 17 Her article is a
grant proposal for a RAND Institute for Civil Justice' 8 study funded
Signals: The Changing Landscape of the Practice, Financing, and Ethics of Civil Litigation in the
Wake of the Tobacco Wars).
12. Id.
13. Ruth Gastel, The Liability System, ILLINOIS INSURANCE ISSUES UPDATI (July 2001).
14. Hensler, supra note 11, at 496.
15. Id. at 496.
16. Id. at 495.
17. Id.
18. The Institute for Civil Justice is an independent research program within RAND. The
Institute's mission is to help make the civil justice system more efficient and more equitable by
supplying government and private decision-makers and the public with results of objective, em-
pirically based, analytic research ... ICJ research is supported by pooled grants from corpora-
tions, trade and professional associations, and individuals; by government grants and contacts;
and by private foundations. The Institute disseminates its work widely to the legal, business, and
2001]
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by the Smith-Richardson Foundation. The proposal compares and
contrasts new social policy tort actions to traditional social impact liti-
gation and traditional class actions.19
The social impact of law is a critical research question that was first
suggested by Dean Roscoe Pound in his theory of social interests and
the law.2 0 Professor Francis Bohlen observed that "the twentieth cen-
tury has brought an increasing realization of the fact that the interests
of society in general may be involved in disputes in which the parties
are private litigants.121 Social policy torts serve the public interest to
the extent that they reallocate the financial burden of caring for to-
bacco smokers, increase the accountability of health maintenance or-
ganizations, and eliminate defective products or risky practices from
the marketplace. It is not surprising that corporate wrongdoers op-
pose social policy torts.
William L. Prosser, in his classic treatise, observed that "perhaps
more than any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a battle-
ground of social theory. '22 Today's battleground is on the appropriate
role of private litigation in shaping public and social policy. Tort law
not only performs the manifest function of "alleviating the plight of
the injured," it also fulfills the latent function of "furthering the cause
of social justice. ' 23 In the last few decades, it is tort law, rather than
regulators, that has uncovered dangerous products or practices. As
Justice Harlan Stone once stated: "The most elementary conceptions
of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the
risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created. ' 24 Professor
Hensler proposes a case study analysis of diverse cases, including: the
class action filed by black customers against Denny's restaurant,2 5 bus
riders who charged the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority
with discrimination,26 black employees who sued Texaco for discrimi-
natory employment practices, 27 a suit brought challenging New York
research communities, and to the general public." RAND Institute for Civil Justice, available at
http://www.rand.org/icj/about (visited September 27, 2001).
19. Id. at 4.
20. Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343 (1915).
21. Francis H. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1937).
22. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 14 (3rd ed. 1964).
23. JOHN G. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (1967).
24. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) (Stone, J., concurring).
25. Hensler, supra note 11, at 504 (citing Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corp., Nos. C 93-20202 JW, C
93-20208 JW (N.D. Cal. 1994).
26. Id. (citing Bus Riders Union v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, 1994).
27. Id. at 14 (citing Roberts v. Texaco Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2015 (S.D. N.Y. 1997).
[Vol. 51:511
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state school financing,28 and law suits brought by inmates of correc-
tional institutions.2 9 Professor Hensler proposes an empirical study of
a broad spectrum of cases in which ordinary citizens used class actions
to bring about social change.30 Her sample "include[s] suits for mone-
tary and policy remedies, public and private defendants, and public
and private plaintiffs' attorneys. '31
Most of the case studies selected by Professor Hensler are ones in
which there is a positive social impact, such as eliminating discrimina-
tion in the workplace, restaurant industry, or mass transit system. A
more complete empirical study would also closely study the seamy
side of social political torts, such as class actions resulting in coupon
settlements. Class action lawsuits may be subject to abusive practices,
especially in so-called "coupon settlements" in which the class mem-
bers receive only a small discount if they purchase additional products
or services from the defendant seller. While the class members collect
a pittance, the plaintiffs' attorneys may receive millions of dollars.
Such self-serving deals do nothing to vindicate the rights of consum-
ers. Economic loss cases, not personal injury litigation, have produced
some of the largest and most controversial settlements. Purely eco-
nomic loss cases include the Ford Motor ignition switch litigation,32
the polybutylene pipe litigation,33 the Miracle Ear litigation, 34 and the
GMC pickup cases.35 I would also encourage Professor Hensler to
compare some of the traditional mass torts to the recent diet drug
class action, the fenfluramine or Redux litigation. Finally, mass torts
are frequently transnational. Future study may focus on the differ-
ences between the United States and Canada where courts are more
liberal in the certification of mass tort claims.36 The controversy over
the Hague convention is a larger debate about the appropriate role
that social policy debates will play in a global economy. One issue,
not in the proposal, is how the Hague Convention, which was adopted
by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference in October 1999,
28. Id. (citing Abby Goodnough, New York City is Shortchanged in School Aid, State Judge
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, at Al, A22).
29. Id.
30. Hensler, supra note 11, at 504.
31. Id.
32. In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332 (D.N.J. 1997).
33. Nat'l Property Investors VIII v. Shell Oil Co., 917 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1995).
34. Martin v. Dahlberg, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
35. In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tanks, 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd 55 F.3d 768
(3rd Cir. 1993).
36. See, e.g., Elaine Massock et al., Recent Developments in International Torts & Insurance
Law & Practice, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 519, 534-36 (1999).
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will impact mass torts.37 It would be useful to study why social policy
torts have evolved faster in the United States than in countries with a
more developed safety net, such as Sweden or West Germany. The
proposed Hague Convention will cover all civil/commercial actions
other than family law, wills, trusts, insolvency, and admiralty. Article
10 of the Convention enforces jurisdiction in the "place where the tort
occurred or injury [was] sustained. '38 Article 3 provides for jurisdic-
tion in the defendant's forum, which for corporations is the place of
incorporation or chief place of business.39 Article 23 provides that
enforcing courts will enforce a final judgment of an original foreign
court.
40
The Hague Convention will only enforce judgments for non-com-
pensatory damages, such as punitive, multiple, or exemplary damages
"to the extent ... similar or comparable damages" could have been
recognized in enforcing courts.41 The Hague Convention permits en-
forcing courts to reduce judgments that are "grossly excessive. '42 Le-
gal academics, as well as plaintiffs' attorneys, will be interested in
knowing more about the transborder nature of mass torts.
A. Empirical Study of Private Attorneys General
Deborah Hensler's article is a critical examination of the en-
trepreneurial role of the trial lawyer in litigating and funding social
policy torts. The private attorney general's role in American jurispru-
dence was first articulated in Associated Industries v. Ickes.43 The le-
gal system of the private attorney general in future litigation
undertaken by other private/public alliances will be undermined if leg-
islatures or courts eliminate social policy torts in the future. Judge
Jerome Frank used the term "private attorney general" to refer to
"any person, official or not," who brought a proceeding "even if the
sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so au-
thorized, are, so to speak, private attorney generals. ' 44 The private
attorney general is a "powerful engine of public policy."' 45 Private at-
37. See generally, Edward C.Y. Lau, Update on the Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 ANN. SuRv. INT'L & COMP. L. 13 (Spring 2000).
38. Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Civil Judgments (October 2000) at Art. 10.
39. Id. at Art. 3.
40. Id. at Art. 23.
41. Id. at Art. 33.1.
42. Id. at Art. 33.2.
43. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
44. Id. at 704.
45. Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 179, 179 (1998).
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torneys, acting as private attorneys general under the contingency fee
system, made this historic tobacco settlement possible.
The private attorney general's role uses private enforcement to ad-
vance the public interest in an efficient manner that is responsive to
market forces. The tobacco settlement is only the most recent mani-
festation of the private attorney general's role in tort litigation. It was
private attorneys general, not regulators, who uncovered "smoking
gun documents" of an industry-wide conspiracy to conceal the risks of
asbestos exposure. 46 It was the fruits of the asbestos litigation that
made it possible to underwrite the tobacco litigation. In this case, the
private attorneys general uncovered internal documents that exposed
tobacco industry lies about addiction and nicotine manipulation,
which led to the tobacco settlement. 47 The private attorney general
plays a valuable role that cannot exist without the contingency fee
system.
Given that the states lack the financial and legal resources to litigate
against the powerful tobacco companies, the trial lawyer's role has a
continuing vitality. Private attorneys, acting as private attorneys gen-
eral under the contingency fee system, made the historic tobacco set-
tlement possible. The private attorneys general led to the only
successful outcome in a tobacco case in four decades of litigation.
Government regulators and legislators have been unable or unwilling
to tackle Big Tobacco despite serious threats to public health. The
private attorney's role is particularly necessary when litigating against
powerful corporate actors.
The tobacco litigation is the most recent example of common law's
ability to evolve to meet the needs of each age. As a nineteenth cen-
tury New York court noted: "It is the peculiar merit of the common
law that its principles are so flexible and expansive as to comprehend
any new wrong that may be developed by the inexhaustible resources
of human depravity." 48 It is not within the rational interest of an at-
torney to undertake future litigation against powerful corporate ac-
tors, such as the tobacco industry, if there is a swirl of uncertainty over
enforcement of contingency fee agreements with the states.
46. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
in the asbestos litigation "punitive damages reward individuals who serve as 'private attorneys
general' in bringing wrongdoers to account.").
47. Henry Weinstein & Myron Levin, Tobacco Companies Flood Internet with Documents Lit-
igation. 27 Million Pages are Posted to Deflect Critics. Charges They're Hiding Damaging Infor-
mation, L.A. TiMEs, Feb. 28, 1998, at Al.
48. Johnson v. Girdwood, 58 N.Y. St. Rep. 338 (1894).
2001]
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My hypothesis is that the social policy role of the private attorney
general will be critically needed in the new millennium. Since the to-
bacco settlement, private attorneys general continue to uncover dan-
gerous corporate practices. Private attorneys general, not government
regulators, discovered that Firestone Tires mounted on Ford Explor-
ers caused hundreds of rollover accidents due to tread separation.
Private litigants, pursuing the public interest, learned that Firestone
had recalled this model of tire in other countries without informing
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) of the
great danger that the tires posed to American drivers. The NHTSA
based its recall of 6.5 million tires on information provided by plain-
tiff's counsel, rather than in-house government investigators.
The private attorney general's role uses private enforcement to ad-
vance the public interest in an efficient manner that is responsive to
market-forces. "The MSA was the result of nearly two years of litiga-
tion brought by forty-six attorneys general in what were called the
Medicaid cases, wherein the states sued the tobacco company for the
health care injury inflicted by tobacco consumption. ' 49 Private law
firms developed and executed the winning strategy against the to-
bacco industry.
The theory that the public interest is advanced by lawsuits brought
by private attorneys is not confined to tort law. A large number of
federal statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, and Federal Trade Commission Act, provide for attorneys fees to
be awarded to private litigants as a reward for serving the public inter-
est in bringing suit.50 The rubric under which all the definitions for
the private attorneys general fall is the emphasis on private action for
the public interest. It is only the possibility of private attorneys gen-
eral receiving a contingency fee that permits lawsuits to be brought to
vindicate the public interest. Tort remedies permit social control of
wrongdoers without an overly cumbersome state bureaucracy.51
The private attorneys general played a critical role in asbestos litiga-
tion. It was private attorneys general, not regulators, who uncovered
49. Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors, and Public Policy, 26 AM. J.L. &
MED. 187, 188 (2000).
50. Dual governmental and private enforcement is provided for in the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. 1-2 (1997), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18 (1997), and the Robinson-Patnam Anti-Dis-
crimination Act, 15 U.S.C. 13-13b (1997); see generally Thomas Koeing & Michael Rustad,
Crimtorts as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 289 (1998).




"smoking gun documents" of an industry wide conspiracy to conceal
the risks of asbestos exposure. 52
In the tobacco settlement, the states contracted with private law
firms to fund the litigation and assume all of the risks. Before the
states joined forces with the private attorneys general, the tobacco
companies had de facto immunity from lawsuits.5 3 When the states
contracted with private law firms, the tobacco industry had been sued
hundreds of times without ever paying damages because during the
first four decades of tobacco litigation, Big Tobacco won every case.
The states hired private law firms to conduct the tobacco litigation
because it was in their economic interest. Before the tobacco settle-
ment, the states lacked the resources to take on the powerful tobacco
industry and to redress the harm the industry caused its citizens:
In this great city, the greatest city of our country, they sit on boards,
they go to their churches and synagogues, they are respected mem-
bers of the community, and every day they go to work. And, eighty-
two percent of the people who start smoking are younger than the
age of eighteen-they do not dispute that-and sixty-seven percent
are below the age of sixteen. And every day they get them, and
they knew by their own documents that they intentionally went af-
ter them.54
The tobacco settlement entered into by the states was a historic mo-
ment in which the trial lawyers, in their role as private attorneys gen-
eral, joined forces with state attorneys general to serve the public
interest. This latest development in using private enforcement to ad-
vance the public interest in an efficient manner is responsive to mar-
ket forces. The tobacco litigation exemplifies the operation of the
private attorney general in controlling corporate misconduct.
The private attorneys general, in the tobacco litigation, provided
the expertise and resources necessary to compensate the states for the
cost of reimbursing non-paying patients who were victimized by
chronic tobacco-related illnesses. The tobacco litigation uncovered
numerous "smoking gun" documents, which revealed an industry-
52. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F. 2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
in the asbestos litigation "punitive damages reward individuals who serve as 'private attorneys
general' in bringing wrongdoers to account").
53. Mitchell L. Lothrop, Tobacco-Related Litigation: How It May Impact the World's Insur-
ance Industry, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 308 (1997) (noting that "the tobacco industry had won
virtually every case it tried. Juries were not sympathetic to habitual smokers and the tobacco
manufacturers spent huge sums in the defense of smoking and health cases. The defense was
extremely well organized and carefully coordinated throughout the country.").
54. Michael Ciresi, Panel Discussion: The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys' Fees, 67 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2827, 2837 (1999).
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wide conspiracy to market the only consumer product unsafe for any
use.
The latent function, or the hidden face, of tort law is its public role
of addressing corporate misconduct without requiring a rigid govern-
ment bureaucracy. Private tort litigants serve the public interest by
uncovering dangerous products and practices. The injury costs of to-
bacco are a great economic hardship to the states. The injuries in-
flicted by tobacco have ripple effects on families, communities, and
medical institutions.
Unlike the private attorneys general, government regulators and
legislators have been unable or unwilling to tackle Big Tobacco de-
spite serious threats to the public health. Tort law shapes public policy
by reallocating the financial burden of caring for tobacco smokers and
increasing the accountability of health maintenance organizations
(HMOs). The private attorney general's role is particularly needed
when litigating against powerful corporate actors. A century ago, pri-
vate attorneys general filed lawsuits to vindicate a public concern in-
volving railroads, streetcar companies, and utilities.
Trial attorneys, acting as private attorneys general, have uncovered
numerous "smoking gun" documents unmasking corporate culpabil-
ity. The treasure chest that funded the tobacco litigation was based in
large part on successful asbestos cases. Private attorneys general, not
state regulators, uncovered evidence of the industry's failure to warn
workers and consumers of the hazards of asbestos dust. An industry-
wide cover-up of the deadly consequences of unprotected exposure to
asbestos dust, which destroyed the health of hundreds of thousands of
American workers, was unmasked in asbestos products liability cases.
Johns-Manville Corporation, for example, had definite knowledge
as early as the 1930s of the deadly consequences of unprotected expo-
sure to asbestos dust, but had a corporate policy of not informing em-
ployees when x-rays taken by company doctors revealed clear
evidence of asbestosis.55 Johns-Manville executives claimed that this
policy was motivated by concern for employees so they "[could] live
and work in peace and the company [could] benefit by their many
years of experience. '56 The asbestos industry lulled government regu-
lators into complacency for decades with false assurances that their
products posed no health hazards. 57
55. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
56. Id.
57. Prudential Ins. Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp. 287 (D.N.J. 1993).
[Vol. 51:511
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Private attorneys general have been particularly effective in pro-
tecting the health and safety of women. Dangerously defective prod-
ucts that have been taken off the market or modified after tort
litigation include the Dalkon Shield, Copper-7 intrauterine devices as-
sociated with reproductive injuries, high absorbency tampons linked
to toxic shock syndrome, oral contraceptives that caused kidney fail-
ures, and silicone-gel breast implants with high rupture rates.
In the field of medical malpractice, torts provide female patients
with remedies for mismanaged childbirth, sexual exploitation by medi-
cal personnel, botched cosmetic surgeries, and the failure of providers
to obtain informed consent.58 All Americans are safer as a result of
private attorneys general whose medical malpractice lawsuits led to
liability limiting policies, such as post-surgery sponge and instrument
counts, greater screening of affiliating physicians, and improved pro-
tocols for emergency room treatment. 59 Elderly and disabled re-
sidents of nursing homes have benefited from the contingency fee
system, which provides the means to obtain legal representation to
redress neglect and substandard treatment by profit seeking corporate
chains.60
Without private law firms assuming these risks, the courthouse
doors will be permanently closed to the states on complex matters,
such as future litigation against the tobacco industry, managed care,
and hand gun manufacturers. The whole point of contingent fee
agreements with the private attorneys is to reallocate the risk of pay-
ing substantial litigation costs and having no recovery. The death of
the contingent fee system in complex litigation will result in de facto
immunity for rogue industries, such as the tobacco industry, because
state legislatures are unlikely to appropriate the tens of millions of
dollars necessary to litigate against exceedingly powerful corporate
wrongdoers.
58. Medical malpractice is a cause of action arising out of an injury or death caused by the
negligence of a medical care provider. Medical malpractice considers prevailing standards of
care in a given medical specialty. The level of care, skill, and treatment must also take into
account surrounding circumstances. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 766.102 (2000).
59. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconcepualizing Punitive Damages in Medical
Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not "Moral Monsters," 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 975,
1021 (1995).
60. "The contingent fee arrangement does not encourage lawyers to accept nonmeritorious
cases with a low probability of winning just because the possible recovery is large." Stephen K.
Dietz et al., "The Medical Malpractice Legal System." REP. SEC. COMM. MALPRAC. (Washing-
ton, D.C.) U.S. DEPART. OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, 87, 154, January 16, 1973.
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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Professor Hensler's article proposes to study the role of public and
private litigation in shaping social policy.61 Her proposed research
project posits three principal research questions:
[1] Are these new [social policy] suits genuine attempts to seek so-
cial reforms that have been thwarted by the legislative process? Or,
are the cases simply entrepreneurial litigation in new clothes? ...
[21 [D]o the new social policy torts violate fundamental democratic
norms of representation and accountability'? Are representation and
accountability issues raised by the new suits substantively different
from or more severe than those raised by other representative liti-
gation, such that they cannot be dealt with by current procedural
rules and judicial doctrine ... ? When litigation is used as a legisla-
tive strategy, does the public accord the resultant policies the same
degree of legitimacy as they accord statutes enacted by popularly
elected legislatures? ... [and]
[3] [I]f, the new social policy torts threaten important values, what
are the appropriate policy responses ... Should we restrict or elimi-
nate these types of suits entirely? 62
B. Financing Social Policy Torts
Professor Hensler's study focuses on the funding of social policy
torts and its implications for a democratic society. The contingency
fee system has long been a form of democracy in action for injured
plaintiffs unable to afford retainers or hourly fees. Contingent fee
contracts "are the basic means by which [personal injury] litigation is
conducted." It is a well established feature of our civil litigation sys-
tem that the contingency fee is the "poor man's key to the court-
house." The use of contingency fee agreements by states in
partnership with private attorneys in social policy torts is a more re-
cent development. The contingency fee agreements in the tobacco lit-
igation was the only practical way that the states could make a
powerful industry accountable without the risky business of paying
millions of dollars in per diem fees or special retainers. In the case of
the tobacco litigation, the contingency fee was the key to the court-
house for the states. The whole point of the contingency fee formula
was to permit the states to litigate without special appropriations. The
continuing vitality of the contingency fee system in future cases is a
public policy issue of profound importance. The tobacco cases were
brought against an industry that employed "scorched earth" like tac-
tics designed to intimidate or bankrupt plaintiffs' counsel. One of the
outside counsel described the tobacco defense team:
61. Hensler, supra note 11, at 502.
62. Hensler, supra note 11, at 502-03.
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And they had the most powerful law firms in the country represent-
ing them, good law firms, outstanding lawyers. In our case, thirty
law firms, 600 lawyers, being paid every single day at $500 an hour,
$550 an hour, $450 an hour, whatever. Every month their bills went
out. They said in court under oath that they spent over $100 million
just producing the privileged documents in our case. RJR said it
spent over $95 million producing its document index. Who did that
money go to? In defending their right-and they have a right to
have that type of defense ... But how are you going to take them
on? Who is going to take them on?63
The unique partnership of state attorneys general and private law
firms resulted in a multistate settlement of all of the participating
states' lawsuits against the industry.64 The legal and financial re-
sources of private law firms created the leverage necessary to bring
the tobacco industry to the bargaining table.
In the tobacco litigation, the private attorneys were retained only
because the states lacked the financial resources and the expertise to
pursue their health reimbursement claims. The contingency fee agree-
ment has long been accepted in our civil justice system as the only
practical means of financing complex litigation, such as the high-risk
tobacco litigation. "In its pure form, the contingency fee is a pre-filing
contractual agreement setting the attorney's fee as a percentage of the
recovery. ' 65 Professor Hensler describes how private lawyers reap
huge profits from social policy cases.66 Trial lawyers like Richard
Scruggs are attacked for enriching themselves through frivolous law-
suits. 67 An advertisement entitled "Smoke" charges that these trial
lawyers are behind new legislation that would give HMO patients a
right to sue their medical insurer. The announcer states: "Laws that
make trial lawyers rich by drowning the courts with new lawsuits, but
could cost almost two million Americans their health insurance . . .
they call that patient protection. But you know who they're really
protecting. '68 An HMO advocacy group broadcasted a television
63. Michael Ciresi, Panel Discussion: The Tobacco Litigation & Attorneys' Fees, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2827, 2837 (1999).
64. Bet-The-Company-Litigation, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 2001, at B14 (discussing new private at-
torney general lawsuits that resulted in tobacco settlement); see also Daniel Kruger, Few Obsta-
cles Remain for States to Receive Tobacco Settlement Funds, THE BOND BUYERS, June 30, 1999,
at 4.
65. Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 347
(1997).
66. Hensler, supra note 11, at 501-02.
67. Robert Dreyfuss, Bill of Wrongs: The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Lawsuits,
AMERICAN PROSPECr, Sept. 10, 2001, at 10 (describing criticism of Richard Scruggs and other
trial lawyers litigating against tobacco and other mass tort actions).
68. AAHP Launches New Television Campaign, PUB. REL. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 25, 1999).
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commercial that portrayed trial lawyers as sharks: "America's richest
trial lawyers are circling-and your health plan is the bait: call Con-
gress today. '69
The flip side of the large attorneys' fees is the high risk in social
policy cases. A complete study of fees in mega cases will examine
losses, as well as wins. When the states retained private attorneys, Big
Tobacco had never lost a case. The contingency fee system is based on
a "no win-no pay principle," and the attorney's fee is proportional to
the outcome.70 The law firms retained by the states risked millions of
dollars, and each assumed the risk of bankruptcy when they agreed to
litigate against Big Tobacco. The outside private counsel not only ex-
pended millions of dollars and years of effort to bring about the settle-
ment, it had opportunity costs as well, because they were precluded
from taking on other less-risky cases. Robert Montgomery, lead
plaintiffs' counsel in the Florida tobacco litigation, recalled his reser-
vations about agreeing to file a case against the seemingly unbeatable
tobacco industry:
I said, "Fred, wait a minute. You want me to be a member of a
team? You know, there are 800 cases that have been tried against
tobacco and none of them have ever been won. And you are asking
me to risk whatever it takes - you tell me" - which in my mind per-
sonally was over $1 million or $2 million - "to take on an industry
that has never been taken on before, and then we are going to have
a trial team? Tobacco has never lost a case." I said, "Are you out
of your mind to call me and ask me?" 71
The tobacco settlement was precedent setting because it was the
first time that the tobacco industry compensated the victims of to-
bacco, their families, or the state. Prior to the tobacco settlement, Big
Tobacco enjoyed a "limited immunity ... from ... regulation," both
from administrative agencies and the legislatures. 72 The state attor-
neys general were able to file suit because private counsel assumed
the cost of prosecuting these cases. The whole point of contingent fee
agreements is to remove from the client's shoulders the risk of being
out-of-pocket for attorney's fees upon a zero recovery. Instead, the
lawyer assumes that risk and is compensated for it by charging what is,
in retrospect, a premium rate.73
69. David Wallis, Some Lawyers Try to Make Nice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, at 3.
70. Alexander, supra note 65, at 347-48.
71. Daniel Capra et al., Panel Discussion: The Tobacco Litigation & Attorneys' Fees, 67 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2827, 2833-34 (1999).
72. Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale & Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 63 (1997).
73. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, THE LAW OF LAWYERINO 8-15 (2001).
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The tobacco case study is not the only social policy tort in which
trial lawyers risk the law firm's financial future. The 1997 film, A Civil
Action, relates the ordeal of several families who sued two Fortune
500 corporations because their predecessor companies dumped indus-
trial solvents into the Woburn, Massachusetts water supply. The
movie, based on a 1996 book, depicts the tragedy of families need-
lessly losing children to leukemia due to environmental polluters. The
movie also highlighted the suffering inflicted by the legal process upon
those who sought redress. 74
A Civil Action is based on the real case of toxic torts, Anderson v.
W.R. Grace,75 in which eight Massachusetts families sued W.R. Grace
and Beatrice Foods for alleged contamination of the Woburn ground-
water with chemicals, including trichloroethylene and te-
trachloroethylene. 76 The Woburn plaintiffs sought to hold both
successor corporations liable for the environmental pollution that oc-
curred over many decades. The film documented how the Woburn
families experienced difficulty in finding a law firm willing to take on
their case.77 Finally, one very small firm could not refuse the families'
pleas, a decision that led to its bankruptcy. 78
The film accurately portrays the great financial and personal risks
that trial lawyers who underwrite social policy lawsuits face. The jury
found W.R. Grace liable for environmental pollution and Beatrice
Foods not liable for tainting the water supply.79 On appeal, the trial
verdict was reversed and remanded. In 1986, the Woburn litigants
agreed to settle the case against W.R. Grace for approximately $8 mil-
lion rather than face a retrial on all the issues. While $8 million seems
like a great deal of money, the litigation expenses were so high that
the eight families received only a small fraction of the settlement.80
The plaintiffs' law firm filed for bankruptcy in the wake of the settle-
ment.81 Because of this deliberate campaign to belittle tort plaintiffs
and their lawsuits, realistic-sounding stories illustrating lawsuit abuse
74. The film was based upon JONATHAN HAAR, A CIVIL AcTION (1996).
75. 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
76. Id. at 1222.
77. American Film Digs Up Toxic Dirt, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Feb. 15, 1999.
78. Id.
79. Joan Vennochi, Jan Sclictmann: Lawyer on Crusade, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 1989, at
25; see also Michael Weisskopf, Toxic Waste Settlement Reached; Massachusetts Case Expected to
Spur Thousands of Similar Suits, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 1986, at A3.
80. Sharon Begley, A Lawsuit Toxic to Justice, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 1995, at 89 (noting that the
settlement in the Woburn tainted water supply did not adequately cover plaintiffs' losses).




have become "urban legends. '8 2 Public relations experts concoct
many of these tort tales by selective distortion of the facts of real
cases. The general public has an unfavorable impression of injured
plaintiffs that stems from a carefully orchestrated campaign to portray
civil litigants as greedy, stupid, or fringe lunatics. Professor Hensler's
study has the potential of unveiling such myths. The typical social pol-
icy tort action involves protracted litigation. Plaintiffs typically incur
human costs in stress, dislocation, employment disruption, and lost
time. Americans are rarely informed that attorneys willing to pursue
social policy torts incur substantial risks.
The tobacco industry employed tactics to intimidate or bankrupt
plaintiffs' counsel, which may be the reason that the tobacco industry
won eight hundred cases in four decades. One of the plaintiff's law-
yers described how the tobacco industry won in a war of attrition
against plaintiffs' counsel.
RJR had a memorandum at a conference they had, and the law-
yer-it was Shook Hardy, I think it was-was asked, "How in the
world do you win these cases?" He said, "Let me tell you some-
thing. I take a page out of Patton's book. It's not that we spend all
of our money; we make the other son-of-a-bitch spend all of theirs,
and that's how we win the lawsuits."'83
Like the plaintiffs in A Civil Action, the victims of big tobacco faced
great difficulties even in the initial task of finding a lawyer willing to
cover the up-front costs of pursuing a complex case. The actual toxic
tort case portrayed in the film cost millions of dollars to pursue, lead-
ing to financial, as well as emotional ruin for plaintiffs' attorneys. The
tobacco litigation had the potential of costing billions of dollars, but in
the four decades of tobacco litigation, plaintiffs found it difficult to
find representation.
C. The Uses of Social Policy Torts
Professor Hensler's central research question is whether social pol-
icy torts are undemocratic in bypassing the legislature. The other side
of the question is the impact on democratic values when companies
are able to pollute water, market defective products, or discriminate
against employees without being accountable. The film A Civil Action
did not depict the aftermath of the litigation when W.R. Grace com-
pletely revamped its environmental policies. The community of
82. JAN HAROLD BRUNVAND, THE MEXICAN PET: MORE "NEW" URBAN LEGENDS AND
SOME OLD FAVORITES 9 (1986)(urban legends are true-sounding but utterly false stories that
pass from person to person even in this modern day).
83. Capra, supra note 71, at 2834.
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Woburn and the Environmental Protection Agency has commended
W.R. Grace for its social responsibility. 84 The lesson from A Civil Ac-
tion is that social policy torts empower ordinary Americans to address
the concerns of the community. Toxic tort cases, such as that in A
Civil Action, have resulted in a safer environment for all citizens. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and W.R. Grace worked co-
operatively in cleaning up contaminated ground water. The purpose
of the tort system is, quite simply, to make the wrongdoer accountable
for damages inflicted or injuries caused, whether by malfeasance, mis-
feasance, or nonfeasance. 85
In tobacco reimbursement cases, the private law firms were litigat-
ing against a "tenacious, unyielding and well-financed" tobacco indus-
try that had the resources to resist indisputable evidence for "one of
the few medical certainties of our time: Cigarettes kill."'8 6 "Juries
were not sympathetic to habitual smokers and the tobacco manufac-
turers spent huge sums in the defense of smoking and health cases."87
In state tobacco cases, private attorneys underwrote all of the ex-
penses and assumed all of the risk in litigating against an industry that
previously was beyond the reach of the law.
The whole point of social policy torts is to permit ordinary citizens
to change corporate practices. Today municipalities are suing hand-
gun manufacturers to recoup the public health and other costs arising
from the negligent marketing of these weapons.8 8 State attorneys gen-
eral are joining forces with private attorneys in prosecuting handgun
distribution cases in New Orleans, Atlanta, and Newark, arguing that
manufacturers should be held accountable for marketing practices
that make it inevitable that many will become the instrumentalities of
urban crimes.89
Rhode Island's attorney general has retained a prominent South
Carolina plaintiffs' law firm to prosecute lead paint manufacturers for
marketing a product that can produce mental retardation in chil-
dren.90 The plaintiffs contend that areas with weak gun control regu-
84. JONATHAN HAAR, A CIVIL AcriON (1996).
85. W.R. Grace recently filed for bankruptcy as a result of its liability for paying asbestos
claims.
86. CYNTHIA CROSSEN, TAINTED TRUTH: THE MANIPULATION OF FACT IN AMERICA 66
(1996)
87. Mitchell L. Lathrop, Tobacco-Related Litigation: How It May Impact the World's Insur-
ance Industry, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 308 (1997)(examining role of the Tobacco Industry Re-
search Committee in resisting mainstream scientific research).
88. See also Joel Stashenko, Court Rules Manufacturers Not Liable for Gun Deaths, Injuries,





lations are provided with more weapons than the local market can
absorb, knowing that the surplus will be resold through illegal chan-
nels.91 Plaintiffs' attorneys in these public/private lawsuits are paid for
their work through contingency fees. These firms do not receive
money unless the state collects a judgment. If the plaintiffs do win,
the payment to the private law firms can be enormous. 92
There is remarkably little empirical research on the social impact of
the tobacco litigation, handgun cases, or other social policy cases.
Before legislatures eliminate this new species of lawsuit, careful em-
pirical study is required. State tort reform statutes were hastily en-
acted on the basis of remarkably little empirical study. In my research
on products liability, I have found unanticipated negative conse-
quences to women, workers, and consumers, as the result of tort re-
form without careful empirical study.93 Restricting patients' rights
through tort reform has not lowered medical bills. Indiana's 1975
Medical Malpractice Reform Act capped all damages at $500,000 and
eliminated punitive damages to lower malpractice outlays. 94
Yet, the mean payment for larger malpractice claims in Indiana
turned out to be substantially higher than in Michigan and Ohio,
neighboring states that did not enact tort reforms such as caps on re-
covery.95 A recent empirical study of Texas insurance rates concluded
that the promised savings from tort reforms have not materialized. 96
The future of social policy torts is in doubt because of the success of
the tort reform movement in convincing state legislatures to limit tort
rights and remedies. A recent study concludes that these tort reform
groups
[c]laim to speak for average Americans and represent themselves as
grassroots citizens groups determined to protect consumer interests.
But their tax filings and funding sources indicate that they actually
represent major corporations and industries seeking to escape liabil-
ity for the harm they cause consumers-whether it be from defec-
91. James Bone, Court Rules Gunmakers Not Responsible for Criminal Use of Weapon, THE
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2001, at 18.
92. John Helyar, They're Ba-a-ack!, FORTUNE, June 26, 2000, at 222.
93. Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Col-
lar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673 (1996).
94. Id. at 729.
95. See, e.g., William P. Gronfein and Eleanor D. Kinney, Controlling Large Malpractice
Claims: The Unexpected Impact Of Damages Caps, 16 HEALTH POLITICS POLICY & LAW 441,
447-48 (1991).
96. A 1999 Study by the Consumer Federation of America found that the promised consumer
savings from Texas tort reforms failed to materialize. J. Robert Hunter, Texas Tort Reform's
Incredible Shrinking "Savings," (1999).
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tive products, medical malpractice, securities scams, insurance
fraud, employment discrimination or environmental pollution. 97
The policy decision to change our tort system by eliminating future
partnerships between public authorities and trial lawyers needs to be
based upon careful empirical study, not anecdotal evidence. Deborah
Hensler's research hypotheses address many issues of great impor-
tance to legislators who must weigh the costs and benefits of social
policy torts.
III. THE IMPACT OF MEGA CASES ON PROCEDURE
Professor Richard Marcus examines the role "of complex litigation
as the sparkplug of modern procedural developments." 98 He begins
his article with a typology of complex litigation of cases in the fields of
(1) commercial litigation; (2) public law litigation; and (3) mass torts. 99
Professor Marcus highlights an interpretation about the character of
modern law by my former teacher, Professor Abram Chayes. °00 In his
1976 article, Chayes observed that "the dominating characteristic of
modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do not arise out of disputes
between private parties about private rights. Instead, the object of
litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies."''o
I would update Chayes' thesis by arguing that tort litigation increas-
ingly vindicates an ever-changing spectrum of consumer rights. The
attitudes explored in the movie Erin Brockovich reflect important so-
cial changes, which have occurred in the last three decades. Consum-
ers feel that they have rights that can be vindicated by the tort system.
Tort law plays an educative function in empowering ordinary Ameri-
cans. The private attorney general role like any other legal institution
can be improved, but the tort reformers do not take an even-handed
approach in analyzing its strengths and shortcomings.
Professor Marcus describes the impact of what he calls mega cases
on procedure. He begins with a typology of mega cases that have
evolved in the past half-century. 10 2 The first generation of mega cases
was the large-scale commercial litigation cases arising out of private
97. Carl Deal and Joanne Doroshow, The CALA Files: The Secret Campaign By Big Tobacco
And Other Major Industries To Take Away Your Rights, (New York: The Center for Justice and
Democracy and Public Citizen, N.Y., 2000).
98. Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Mega Cases on Procedure, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 457 (2001).
99. Id. at 458-64.
100. Id. at 473.
101. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976).
102. Marcus, supra note 98, at 459-60.
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antitrust cases in the 1950s. The 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation 0 3 was emblematic of public law litigation, the second wave of
mega cases. 104 Marcus devotes the remainder of his article to mass
torts, the third wave of mega cases. The first mass tort case of conse-
quence was the MER/29.10 5 The MER/29 case qualifies as the first
mega case in the field of mass torts that shaped both substantive prod-
ucts liability law, as well as the procedures for litigating punitive
damages.
Punitive damages in products liability were first judicially recog-
nized in the mid-1960s in the infamous MER/29 scandal. Richardson-
Merrell's concealment of the numerous dangerous side effects of this
anti-cholesterol drug led juries to award the first punitive damages for
a defective product. 10 6 MER/29 was thought to reduce the risk of
heart attacks and strokes. 0 7 Richardson-Merrell began animal testing
of MER/29 in 1957.108 All of the laboratory rats that ingested MER/
29 suffered immediate abnormal blood changes.'0 9 Richardson-Mer-
rell had evidence of a profile of developing danger, which was made
even clearer after a second rat study uncovered abnormal blood
changes caused by MER/29. 10
An extended test of MER/29 was conducted on laboratory monkeys
in early 1959."t' The technicians observed that the monkeys were fall-
ing off the exercise bars because the drug blinded them. The scientist
directing the study ordered a Richardson-Merrell laboratory techni-
cian "to falsify a chart of this test by recording false body weights for
the monkeys. ''1 2 When the lab technician protested, a Richardson-
Merrell official told her: "You do as he tells you and be quiet. '' 113 The
MER/29 records were further altered, showing ersatz positive results
long after the monkeys were killed. Richardson-Merrell produced a
brochure for the medical community, employing the falsified test re-
sults and excising any reference to the high correlation between MER/
103. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
104. Marcus, supra note 98, at 461.
105. Id. at 463.
106. Ostopowitz v. Richardson-Merril, Inc., No. 587 9/63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 7,1966) cited in
Michael L. Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes
with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REV. 1, 18, 88-89 (1992).
107. The Mer/29 vignette is drawn from Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,
403 (Ct. App. 1967).




112. Id. at 404.
113. Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
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29 and abnormal blood conditions.1 14 The company submitted wholly
fictitious body and organ weights and blood tests for dead rats to fool
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) into believing that the test
animals had survived.' 1 5
The FDA reviewers informed Richardson-Merrell that its new drug
application was incomplete and ordered an additional two-year study
of rats and a three-month study of dogs.1 16 Nine out of the ten rats in
the study soon developed eye opacities from the effects of MER/29.
Richardson-Merrell concealed the severity of the problem by report-
ing that eight out of the twenty rats that took MER/29 developed mild
inflammation of the eye. 117 The company's examination of the rats
was conclusive: twenty-five out of thirty-six rats developed opacities
as a result of ingesting MER/29.118 Richardson-Merrell completed its
study of dogs in February of 1960. One dog in the test group suffered
total blindness from the drug, and the results of these tests were with-
held from the FDA.119
The misinformed FDA granted Richardson-Merrell's application to
market MER/29, and the drug was launched onto the market with an
unprecedented promotional and advertising campaign. 120 Doctors
were provided with more promotional literature on MER/29 than they
had received for any previous medical product. Richardson-Merrell's
brochures claimed that "MER/29 was ... virtually nontoxic and re-
markably free from side effects even on prolonged clinical use." 121
Two months after the drug was approved, the FDA received an un-
solicited whistle-blowing letter from Dr. Loretta Fox, a Richardson-
Merrell scientist.1 22 Dr. Fox reported that in her experiments with
MER/29 and rats, she had personally observed corneal eye opacities
caused by the drug.123 The FDA passed the scientist's letter on to
Richardson-Merrell and solicited its comments. 124 Richardson-Mer-
rell's top officials told a different story. The head of the company's
toxicology department responded that MERI29 was used on
thousands of rats and only one group showed any eye changes. 125 The
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 405.
117. Id.
118. Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 406.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 405.




Richardson-Merrell memorandum to the FDA falsely asserted: "We
have no evidence from our experience or from the literature that
MER/29 would in itself, produce such changes. ' 126 Yet, Richardson-
Merrell's pathologist further tested the long-term effects of MER/29
and found that the laboratory rats were blinded by low, as well as high
dosages of MER/29.
Richardson-Merrell received the first adverse reaction reports from
humans taking MER/29 as early as January of 1961.127 A patient com-
plained of a film over his eyes after using MER/29 for a short pe-
riod. 28 The highest officials of Richardson-Merrell were told of eye
lesions in humans, as well as in animals, yet it continued to claim that
there were no adverse reactions from the drug. 129 A field report sub-
mitted to the company documented that a doctor taking MER/29 suf-
fered eyesight deterioration from the drug. Still, physicians continued
to be told by sales representatives that MER/29 was a proven drug
and there was no question of its efficacy or of its safety.130
The pharmaceutical company had received more than fifty reports
of thinning hair from persons taking MER/29 by March of 1961.131
Richardson-Merrell's Vice President made a corporate decision not to
inform the sales department about adverse reaction reports because of
a concern that the test data would "discourage efforts in promoting
sale of the drug. ' 132 The Mayo Clinic reported two case studies of
patients developing cataracts, suffering hair loss, and experiencing
skin irritation after taking MER/29 by late 1961.133 A Richardson-
Merrell official telephoned the FDA in late 1961, reading a proposed
reassurance letter that the company hoped to send to the medical pro-
fession.1 34 The misleading letter gave an anemic warning of the then
known side effects of "skin trouble, falling hair and cataracts, but ad-
vis[ed] doctors that they could continue use of the drug."'135
FDA officials met with Richardson-Merrell's President in Novem-
ber of 1961.136 The FDA concluded that MER/29 should be immedi-
ately recalled from the market.1 37 Richardson-Merrell was reluctant
126. Id. at 405-06.
127. Id. at 406.
128. Id. at 406.
129. Id.
130. Toole, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
131. Id. at 406.
132. Id. at 407.
133. Id. at 407.
134. Id. at 416.
135. Id.
136. Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
137. Id. at 408.
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to suspend sales even after the FDA seized its records and uncovered
the misreported research findings.1 38 MER/29 was administered to
approximately 400,000 consumers, injuring at least 50,000 patients in
its short time on the market. 39 Consumers developed serious
problems after using the drug for periods of less than three months. 140
The Vice President of Richardson-Merrell argued that MER/29 was
the "biggest and most important drug in Richardson-Merrell history
.. and vowed to defend it at every step.' 141
A New York jury awarded $100,000 in punitive damages based
upon evidence that Richardson-Merrell lied to the FDA, the medical
profession, and consumers about the safety of MER/29.' 42 The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, observing that there was the potential for abuse
in awarding punitive damages because the New York litigation was
the first of some seventy-five similar cases to be litigated. The court's
concern about overkill proved to be unfounded because the MER/29
disaster resulted in only three punitive damage awards.1 43 Company
founder William Merrell and several other Richardson-Merrell execu-
tives were fined for submitting false animal data to the FDA, but
served no prison time. The impact of the successful MER/29 litigation
was monumental as this was the first case in the history of product
liability that a company was assessed punitive damages for marketing
a dangerously defective product. 44
Before the development of mega cases in mass tort actions, many
plaintiffs went uncompensated. Hundreds of plaintiffs were injured in
mass torts involving railways, streetcars, steamboats, and other instru-
mentalities but there was no procedural mechanism for trying a mass
tort. Since the MER/29 cases, mass torts have transformed tort law's
common law foundation. The history of tort law demonstrates a pro-
gressive recognition of societal, as well as individual interests. 45
Cases involving Dalkon Shield, 146 Copper-7,147 breast implant litiga-
138. Paul Rheingold, The MER/29 Story - An Issuance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation,




142. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967)(reversing punitive
damages award).
143. The same evidence led the California court to affirm a $500,000 punitive damages award
in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
144. David Lauter, Justice Dept. Investigating Lilly's Marketing of Oraflex, NAT'L L.J., at 3.
145. ROSCOE POUND, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 249 (1941).
146. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class
Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 213 (2001).
147. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab, 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
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tion,148 Phen-Fen litigation, 149 and other medical product cases have
vindicated the rights of women. Marcus is correct in observing that
mass torts are largely a development of the past three decades.
With the coming of the industrial revolution, tort law shifted to in-
dustrial accident law. Today, the emphasis has shifted to mega cases
or social policy torts. Before there were mega cases, there was mega
death from mass disasters, such as railroad or industrial accidents.
The law of torts entered the negligence era "around the turn of the
nineteenth century as turnpikes and burgeoning industry were vastly
accelerating the pulse of activity and confronting society with an acci-
dent problem of hitherto unprecedented dimensions."150 Negligence
was a system of compensation for accidents associated with new dan-
gers associated with industrialization.' 5' Under this new regime, "in-
tentional injuries whether direct or indirect, were grouped as a distinct
field of intentional torts" while negligence provided remedies for the
victims of accidents. 52
The first recorded train wreck with passenger fatalities occurred two
years later in 1833.153 Forty-six passengers were crushed or drowned
to death when a train ran through an open drawbridge in Norwalk,
Connecticut, in 1853.154 Perhaps the most shocking accident occurred
on July 17, 1856 in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, when two Northern Penn
trains crashed head-on. Sixty-six church children bound for a picnic
died in the flaming wreckage.' 55 A boiler explosion on a Mississippi
River steamboat near Memphis killed 1,547 people on April 27,
1865.156 The "legal delinquency" in each of these cases was fatal neg-
ligence by the common carrier, not a desire to hurt anyone. Negli-
gence law, in no small part, was railway, streetcar, and steamboat
accident law. The nineteenth century law reporters did not report
148. See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 1995 WL 495978 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 1995)
(giving a brief history of breast implant litigation).
149. McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 453 F.2d 1033 (1st Cir. 1972); see generally, Caren A.
Crisanti, Product Liability of Prescription Diet Drug Cocktail, Fen-Phen: A Hard Combination to
Swallow, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 207 (1998).
150. JOHN 6. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 4 (1967).
151. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 28, 161 (5th ed. 1988) ("Intentional inju-
ries, whether direct or indirect, began to be grouped as a distinct field of liability, and negligence
remained as the main basis for unintended torts. Negligence thus developed into the dominant
cause of action for accidental injury in this nation today.").
152. Id.





2001] SMOKE SIGNALS 535
mega cases because there was no mechanism for citizens to recover
for mass disasters.157
Negligence evolved to compensate the victims of accidents caused
by common carriers and industrial corporations that failed to use rea-
sonable care to protect the public.158 Courts held that it was negli-
gent, for example, to fail to blow a whistle at a railway crossing or to
negligently operate a train.159 "The modern law of torts must be laid
at the door of the industrial revolution, whose machines had a marvel-
ous capacity for smashing the human body. ' 160 The heyday of the
negligence era was between 1850 and 1910 when courts recognized
liability-limiting doctrines, such as contributory negligence and the as-
sumption of risk.161 American society had mass injury and death long
before the tort law and law of civil procedure developed mechanisms
for adjudicating the mega case.
Professor Marcus contends that complex litigation has been the
principal change agent since "the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."'1 62 He contends that "big cases prompt procedural
changes, and in turn, those procedural changes, produce more big
cases. ' 163 However, he argues that tobacco litigation "has been a dud
in terms of procedural innovation.' ' 164 Professor Marcus hypothesizes
that "the presumed connection between megalitigation and procedu-
ral innovation may be epochal rather than eternal.' 165
The tobacco litigation has resulted in innovations of the substantive
area of the law. The tobacco settlement provides remedies for pro-
spective harms, rather than solely redressing past injuries as in the
157. THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 30 (2001).
158. Negligence is an act or omission by which the defendant fails to exercise the due care of a
reasonable person in the circumstances.
159. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE BORDERLAND OF TORT AND CONTRACT, SELECTED TOPICS
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 411 (1953). Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and
the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967); see also THOMAS H. KOENIG &
MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 12 (2001) (noting that "[niegligence was a
byproduct of the social, economic, political, and technological changes that accompaned large-
scale industrialization").
160. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467 (2d ed. 1986).
161. Knowledge of the risk is critical to a finding that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily
assumed it. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co. v. Thompson, 236 F. 1, 9 (6th Cir. 1916). In order for
there to be assumption of risk, there must be knowledge and apprehension of the specific risk
and a voluntary choice to assume it. When the defense was originally conceived, the workers
only choice was to assume the risk of workplace hazard or lose their job.
162. Marcus, supra note 98, at 457.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 458.
165. Id.
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typical tort action. 166 The tobacco litigation is also path breaking in its
remedy, which is designed to re-socialize the American public about
the dangers of smoking. The settlement is also unique because it com-
pensates the states, rather than the direct victims of tobacco-related
illnesses.
My hypothesis is that the Big Bang in tort law would be the syner-
gistic impact of procedural changes and a simultaneous expansion of
substantive rights and remedies. The procedural reforms of the Rules
of Civil Procedure made it possible for trial lawyers to discover
"smoking gun" documents exclusively in the possession of manufac-
turers and other defendants. The pro-plaintiff expansion of substan-
tive tort law combined with liberal discovery and other procedural
reforms made mega cases possible.
The principal path of American tort law following World War II has
been an expansion of substantive rights and remedies, making social
policy and mega cases possible. Prior to the 1960s, manufacturers
were shielded from liability by the doctrine of privity and other barri-
ers to recovery. A manufacturer was not liable for injuries caused by
defective products unless they joined in the making of a contract with
a consumer. 67 Absent a direct contractual link, there was no manu-
facturer liability to an injured consumer.
Medical malpractice has also emerged as a viable field since the
mid-1960s. 168 Today, medical malpractice remedies punish negligent
nursing home chains, dishonest insurance companies, and irresponsi-
ble health care entities that damage the public welfare through indif-
ference or to increase corporate profits. The contemporary anti-tort
law campaign arose as a response to the expansion of tort rights in the
post World War II era. Prior to the 1940s, defendants had few worries
about product liability because privity of contract stymied most cases
against national manufacturers. 169 Doctors were seldom sued for mal-
practice because of charitable immunities and the difficulty of finding
166. Paul LeBel, Beginning the Endgame: The Search For an Injury Compensation System
Alternative to Tort Liability for Tobacco-Related Harms, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 457, 470-71 (1997).
167. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403-04 (1842).
168. See Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue
collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 715 (1996); see also Michael L. Rustad
& Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting
Amoral Corporations, Not "Moral Monsters," 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 975, 1046-47 (1995) (noting
that health care institutions were immune from tort liability prior to the 1960s because of chari-
table or government immunity and other barriers to patient recovery).
169. Under the doctrine of privity, there must be a direct contractual relationship between the
injured party and the company responsible for the injury. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power




doctors to testify against other doctors. The abolition of many immu-
nities and defenses, the adoption of "strict liability," and an "emerging
concern about toxic exposures and a broader-based rise in claims con-
sciousness on the part of the public," led to an increase in awards. 170
Premises liability emerged as a distinct cause of action in the
1970s. a71 The development of premises liability permitted the victims
of crimes to file lawsuits for unsafe conditions in shopping malls,
apartment buildings, and residential property. Hotels and motels
across the country have improved security after guests who were
robbed, raped, or murdered by intruders filed liability lawsuits. 172
The MGM Grand Hotel fire of 1980 killed eighty-five and injured
another five hundred guests. 173 Three thousand claims were filed
against the hotel for its inadequate sprinkler and alarm system.174 Af-
ter these lawsuits, the MGM Grand was rebuilt with improved state-
of-the-art ventilation, a new sprinkler system, and carefully monitored
alarms. 7 5 The expansion of rights and remedies in the post World
War II period has now reversed itself, primarily because of the efforts
of the tort reform movement.
Professor Marcus next develops a typology of mega cases, which
have evolved since World War II. Large-scale commercial litigation,
public law litigation, and mass torts have been the three major doctri-
nal developments.1 76 Marcus argues that mass torts have been the
most prominent sort of mega litigation. 7 7 The earliest procedural
changes occurred in the field of commercial or business litigation. 78
Corporate wrongdoing was a principal impetus to procedural rules on
multidistrict transfer and consolidation. 79 In the last quarter century,
mass torts have played a critically important role in procedural
reform.
170. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STANDFORD L.
REV. 853 (1992).
171. Premises liability historically depended upon the status of the entrant. Trespassers were
owed the lowest level of care, whereas invitees were owed the highest duty of care. Licensees
were accorded a middle level standard of care. Since 1970, the status categories have gradually
been replaced by a standard of care that depends upon the circumstances.
172. See, e.g., King v. Trans-Sterling, Inc., No. A219783 (Dist. Ct. of Clark Cty. Nev. 1985).
173. In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litigation, 660 F. Supp. 522 (D. Nev. 1987); see also
Michael Hirsley, 2 Suits Filed in Hotel Disaster, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 6, 1987, at 4.
174. The Law MGM Grand Fears, Bus. WK., Apr. 6, 1981, at 115.
175. ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, CASES THAT MADE A DIFFERENCE 15
(1993).
176. Marcus, supra note 98, at 459-64.
177. Id. at 463.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 464-65.
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Marcus notes that corporate defendants have made it expensive to
bring mega cases through tactics such as "dump truck" discovery. 180
Discovery reform is particularly urgent in the age of the Internet. The
new information technologies make it easy to destroy or alter evi-
dence with a click of the mouse or through the creative use of the
delete key. A corporation's intentional deletion of incriminating e-
mail may create liability for the tort of spoliation. 181 In New Jersey, a
court imposed a $1 million sanction to punish a company's failure to
preserve key documents in litigation. 82 The tort of spoliation and
concomitant punitive damages is an efficient deterrent against de-
stroying or modifying electronic "smoking guns." However, new dis-
covery reforms are needed to permit individuals and institutions to
vindicate their rights in an online environment. The next wave of
mega cases is likely to reflect the shift of our economy from durable
goods to an information-based networked economy.
IV. McGOVERN'S ECONOMIC MODEL OF ASBESTOS CLAIMS
Twenty four million Americans are believed to have had physical
contact with asbestos fibers from asbestos products between 1939 and
1980.183 The number of asbestos-related products liability cases is
now in the hundreds of thousands and still growing. Men were dispro-
portionately victimized, being exposed to asbestos in the military, in
shipyards, in mines, and in other places of male dominated employ-
ment. In the early asbestos cases, plaintiffs' attorneys uncovered
"smoking guns" that confirmed an industry wide practice of failing to
warn workers of the known hazards of asbestos cases:
In 1935, Brown, corporate attorney for Johns-Manville and Sumner
Simpson, the President of Raybestos-Manhattan, exchanged letters
in which they agreed that it would be beneficial if no articles about
asbestos would appear in the asbestos industry's trade journal; that,
in 1947, the Industrial Hygiene Foundation ... failed to publish a
study showing that 20 percent of the workers in two of their asbes-
180. Dump truck discovery is a tactic of responding to discovery requests by turning over
hundreds of thousands of documents to the plaintiff. The relevant document may be hidden
among irrelevant documents overwhelming the plaintiff. Dump truck discovery was depicted in
the film, A Civil Action.
181. Spoliation of evidence is the deliberate destruction of, or the failure to preserve, essential
evidence. Employment Law Destruction of Hiring Documents Precludes Summary Judgment
Second Circuit Decision Focuses on Missing Ballots Ranking Job Applicants, N.J.L.J., May 21,
2001 (noting that destruction of e-mail documents may constitute spoliation although there is no
case law on point).
182. In re Prudential Insurance Co. of American Sales Practices Litigation, 169 F.R.D. 598,
617 (D.N.J. 1997).
183. Asbestos Makers Face Bankruptcy, TOWNSVILLE BULLETIN, Aug. 16, 2001, at 23.
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tos-textile factories had developed asbestosis . . . [and the compa-
nies] made efforts to suppress public knowledge of the link between
asbestos exposure and the development of cancer. 184
In the first wave of asbestos cases, individual plaintiffs usually filed
products liability actions on a failure to warn theory. Much of the
increase in products liability litigation during the 1980s was attributa-
ble to asbestos litigation. The same "smoking gun" documents were
introduced in thousands of similar cases. The role of the private attor-
ney general in uncovering dangerous conduct was prominent in the
first cases litigated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The efficiency of
the private attorney general institution with American tort law was
epitomized by the first successful asbestos case. It was trial attorneys,
not regulators, who uncovered definitive evidence that asbestos manu-
facturers deliberately concealed the danger of asbestos dust in order
to protect the industry's profits. By the early 1990s, the private attor-
ney general role in asbestos litigation had grown very thin indeed as
hundreds of thousands of similar cases were filed using the same
"smoking gun" documents.
Professor Francis McGovern's paper entitled Economic Opportuni-
ties and Asbestos Claims Resolution Facilities185 closely examines a sin-
gle social policy or mega case, the asbestos litigation. He describes a
new model for adjudicating claims premised on a mass tort philosophy
based upon probabilities rather than individual justice. In the tradi-
tional model, an attorney absorbs the costs of depositions, motions,
pleadings, trial, and the post-verdict period. In my empirical study of
punitive damages in product liability, I found that the costs could be
quite considerable. There were cases in my sample in which plaintiffs'
attorneys fronted many millions of dollars. The routine product liabil-
ity case may involve tens of thousands of dollars. Professor McGov-
ern notes that the contingency fee attorney has a very low probability
of recovering any money in the early years of litigation. McGovern
explains that the expected return for a plaintiff's attorney and his cli-
ent in the first three years of traditional litigation is zero. 186 In the
asbestos litigation, the typical plaintiff will either be deceased or in
very poor health before receiving a verdict or settlement under the
traditional model. The traditional model of case-by-case adjudication
184. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUcr: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 242
(1985).
185. Francis McGovern, Economic Opportunities and Asbestos Claims Resolution Facilities,
Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy:
Smoke Signals: The Changing Landscape of the Practice, Financing, and Ethics of Civil Litiga-
tion in the Wake of the Tobacco Wars, April 5, 2001 (paper on file with author).
186. Id. at 2.
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gave way to the mass tort out of necessity. McGovern notes that the
movement to a mass torts claim model was driven by "the sheer vol-
ume of cases and suits filed against defendants.' ' 187 He notes that the
stakeholders in the asbestos litigation favored an expedited settlement
method.1 88 By the early 1990s, asbestos cases were clogging the court-
rooms. I visited a federal court in Miami in 1989 and observed that an
entire courtroom was devoted to asbestos cases. Asbestos products
liability cases created a crisis in our court system as thousands of cases
were filed based upon the same profile of danger and a similar pattern
of injury. Judges sought innovative ways of reducing the cost of adju-
dicating asbestos claims. The crushing volume of asbestos cases led
the defense bar to seek new methods of resolving asbestos claims.189
The trial attorneys, judges, and claimants sought a way to settle claims
quickly.
Professor McGovern compares the costs and returns for an attorney
pursuing an asbestos claim under the traditional model to the return
stream in a mass tort case involving single and multiple defendants.
He begins with a formula that considers the present value of money
and the discount rate. 190 It is striking how the traditional contingency
fee approach provides such a heavy cost and virtually no prospect of
return in the early years of litigation. In McGovern's model, the early
years in torts litigation represent high cost and no return. Tort lawyers
are not only litigators, but sophisticated de facto banks under the
traditional regime.
Professor McGovern demonstrates that the return stream for mass
tort settlements is quite different. Plaintiffs and their attorneys have a
much higher probability of an award and settlement in the early years.
The model of the single defendant mass tort shows an immediate dis-
counted settlement in the first year, whereas there is no revenue
stream in the traditional torts model. The mass torts model uses the
concept of economy of scale to reduce costs.191 The economy of scale
permits a single trial attorney to settle "hundreds of claims" for essen-
tially the same cost as a single claim under the individual justice
model.
187. Id. at 3.
188. W. Kip VIscusi, REFORMING PRODUcr LIABILITY 20 (1991)(arguing that the increase in
product liability is attributed to the unique mass tort of asbestos).
189. McGovern, supra note 185.
190. The formula which McGovern calls the "plaintiff attorney economic model" computes
the number of cases, individual, year, discount rate, return and cost. I assume that "Bijou"





Professor McGovern describes the Asbestos Claims Facility Model
as representing a third model in which a single plaintiff's attorney files
hundreds of claims against multiple manufacturers. 192 The asbestos
claims market is a byproduct of the bankruptcy of many of the asbes-
tos manufacturers. 193 The trust permits a single attorney to sue multi-
ple defendants and obtain speedy recovery for hundreds, if not
thousands of cases. His paper is a justification of the trust as an effi-
cient method of processing claims. It is difficult to argue against the
asbestos claim market as an efficient way of dealing with the asbestos
litigation in the wake of widespread insolvency in the industry. The
lesson of the asbestos cases is the capacity of tort law to evolve to
meet changing societal demands. Tort lawyers developed a cost struc-
ture and method of processing claims that was efficient. Professor
McGovern notes that when costs are factored, the claimant's attorney
earns between $4.50 and $312.50 in the typical pleural claim. The rev-
enues and profits of trial attorneys processing these claims do not ap-
pear too exorbitant. 194 The asbestos litigation illustrates the growing
pains of a new legal institution developed to cope with mass torts with
hundreds of thousands of victims.
V. CONCLUSION
The social policy torts, asbestos litigation, and other mega cases re-
flect tort law's remarkable quality of continually evolving to meet new
social needs. The private attorney general is a valuable legal institu-
tion, which cannot function without the contingency fee system in
mass tort cases. Corporate America favors curbing the use of private
attorneys general in public interest litigation. George W. Bush signed
a bill in 2000 limiting the authority of Texas' attorney general to retain
private companies to aid in class action lawsuits. 195 The Interstate
Class Action Jurisdiction of 1999 is the most recent in a series of bills
proposing federal limits on consolidated lawsuits, products liability
suits, medical malpractice awards, and punitive damages. The bill
passed the House, but was not enacted by the Senate.196 At the fed-
eral level, Congress is presently considering legislation to require all
large class actions to be filed in federal court unless the plaintiffs are
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. McGovern, supra note 185.
195. Id.
196. Harvey Berkman, Tort Reform Measure, Facing Stiff Opposition, Unlikely to Become
Law, NAT'L L.J., October 4, 1999, at A5.
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residents of a single state.197 This will have the effect of preventing
class actions from being pursued in states chosen for their relatively
pro-plaintiff courts. Before Congress and the states eliminate future
private/public partnerships or cripple social torts, they should require
tort reformers to produce solid empirical data rather than tort horror
stories. Tort law's remarkable quality continually adapting old causes
of action to new threats and dangers makes it an important institution
of social control. A strong regime of social policy torts and mega torts
ensures that not even multi-billion dollar industries such as Big To-
bacco are beyond the reach of the law. Tort law is, as it has always
been, forward-looking with the ability to confront new social
problems and conditions.
I
197. See The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act., H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (1999).
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